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The Dutch welfare state has changed in the last decades. These changes can be 
characterized as a slow transformation from a system based on notions of equality and 
solidarity to a system that is increasingly influenced by the values of freedom of choice 
and individual responsibility (Jaspers, 2001; Noordam, 2007; Trommel and Van der Veen, 
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1999; Van Gestel et al, 2010; Clasen and Van Oorschot, 2002). This values shift might be 
illuminated by a short history of the Dutch welfare state.  
The contours of the Dutch welfare state appeared for the first time in the 
influential Van Rhijn report from 1945. This report argued in favor of a reformed system 
of social security that ensures a decent life for the entire population (Van Rhyn 
Committee, 1945). In the years that followed, a collective system was built up that 
aspired to cover all possible collective risks. This collective responsibility for individual 
welfare fitted in well with the paternalistic welfare state discourse that was popular at the 
time: social security should take care of the citizens ‘from cradle to grave’. However, in 
the mid-1970s, with the social security system ‘completed’, the Netherlands (like the rest 
of Europe) were struck by an economic crisis. This triggered the first retrenchments of 
the social security system. In the 1980s, discourses on the widespread improper use of 
social benefits and the unmanageable costs of the welfare state on the system justified a 
further reduction of the system. In addition, because of European demands regarding 
equal treatment of men and women, so-called breadwinner facilities were abolished in 
favor of more individualized facilities that endorse equal treatment of men and women. In 
the 1990s the increased labor market participation of women resulted in further changes 
of social security provisions. For example, allowances for survivors of diseased 
breadwinners became means-tested (ANW).     
The report by the Buurmeijer Committee marked a new shift in the design of the 
Dutch welfare state (Buurmeijer Committee, 1993). This report revealed how the 
corporatist organization of unemployment and disability schemes had encouraged welfare 
dependency, instead of reintegrating unemployed and disabled workers into paid 
employment. The report advocated the transfer of responsibilities of trade unions and 
employers organizations to the state. In addition, the report argued for the introduction of 
market processes in the social security system and an increased emphasis on incentives 
and disincentives instead of rights and obligations. The governmental actors took the 
‘welfare state crisis’ seriously and it would take only a few years before major welfare 
state reforms were introduced (Kuipers, 2004).
 
From the mid-1990s onwards, 
responsibilities for the risks of sickness and disability were shifted from the state to 
individual employers. In addition, sick and disabled employees themselves increasingly 
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faced duties to reintegration to work. The years 2000 were characterized by further social 
reforms with the objective to encourage labor market participation of recipients of several 
types of social benefits. In fact, with respect to social insurances we can observe a few 
trends in the last two decades. First of all, private bodies, organized according to the 
corporatist principle, were replaced by state organized public bodies. Secondly, the 
responsibility for the risks of unemployment and disability shifted from the state and 
social partners towards individual employers and employees. Thirdly, as a result of the 
introduction of the Work and Welfare act in 2004, municipalities acquired more 
discretion with respect to social assistance. Finally, civil society was revitalized as a new 
act on long-term care stressed the role of volunteer aid and self-organization.
1
 
 In the seminal classification of Esping-Anderson, the Dutch welfare state was 
characterized as a corporatist welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Notwithstanding the 
changes in the organization of social insurances, where private bodies organized by social 
partners are replaced by public bodies, the Dutch welfare state still constains a 
considerable number of corporatist characteristics. That is, the social security system is 
still made up of occupational social insurance provisions, providing earnings-related 
benefits to workers and employers which are financed by both employers and employees, 
such as provisions for disability (WIA) and unemployment (WW). In addition, an 
obligatory occupational pension scheme organized by the employees and employers 
provide income protection for employees over 65. Besides these occupational provisions, 
the Dutch welfare state has universal provisions in the fields of active labor market policy, 
children, health and long term care, old age, housing, education and social assistance, 
social support and in case of deceased breadwinners. However, given the increased focus 
on labour market participation and the emphasis on activation in several welfare state 
programs, a growing number of welfare state scholars classify the Dutch welfare state as 
a Nordic welfare state (Sapir, 2006; Draxler and Van Vliet, 2010). 
Interestingly, the increased emphasis on civil society and individual responsibility 
seems to encompass a return to the emergence of the Dutch welfare state in the 
nineteenth century. In that period, poor relief was organized by religious and other 
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 For example, the WMO act, which was introduced in 2006, explicitly expressed a preference for 
individual responsibility, self-organization and volunteer aid in case of disability, psychosocial problems 
and chronic psychological problems. In addition, a reform in 2012 introduced civic duties for welfare.    
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private initiatives. Moreover, private organizations and churches strongly resisted a 
public organization of poor relief, which they viewed as a public interference with their 
private charity activities. For example, the first poor law of 1854 could only be adopted 
after the role of private charity organizations and churches was properly addressed. In 
fact, from 1917 on, when the school funding controversy officially came to an end, the 
Netherlands were characterized by a pillarization of society (Lijphart, 1968). In this year 
the state agreed to finance denominational education, such as catholic and protestant 
schools in a similar way as public education. As a result, Dutch society became 
increasingly segmented along three pillars: the protestant, the catholic and the socialist 
pillars. The pillarization of society was visible in the organization of other welfare state 
arrangements as well, such as housing and healthcare, highlighting the role of civil 
society with respect to welfare provisions.  
The goal of this paper is to assess how shifts in the allocations of welfare state 
services from the state to other actors have affected individual right claims with respect to 
welfare state services. As such this paper addresses important questions as to whether it 
matters who is the debtor towards these rightful claimants: a public body, a private 
institution or a private actor? Dutch history has shown that non-state actor involvement in 
the realization of welfare state provisions and services does not automatically preclude 
claim rights on those provisions and services. For example, after the school funding 
controversial came to an end all citizens could claim a right to state financed education 
and citizens retained the freedom to organize education by themselves. In addition, 
thanks to the organization of social insurance by the social partners, members of trade 
unions could legally put claims on unemployment benefits as early as the beginning of 
the twentieth century. On the other hand, however, the private-public collaboration on 
poor relief inhibited a legally subjective right to social assistance. Only in 1965, when the 
National Assistance Act (AWB) replaced the poor law, citizens acquired for the first time 
an individual right to social assistance. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the state of the art of the Dutch 
welfare state institutions and seeks to provide an answer to questions as: What kind of 
claim rights on welfare state provisions can be distinguished and where in the law can we 
find these rights? Section 3 provides an overview of the long term developments of a 
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number of welfare state programs using data on social expenditures and other welfare 
state indicators. Section 4 addresses recent shifts in the allocations of welfare services 
from the state to employers and municipalities. This section also examines the 
implications of the new allocation of welfare services for the public safeguards of 
individual claim rights. Section 5 examines if and how, with respect to these new 
allocations of welfare services, international and European law provide (extra) public 
safeguards for individual claim rights. Section 6 concludes the paper.  
  
2. The state of the art: current Dutch welfare state arrangements 
In Dutch social security law literature, social security law, which contains mainly rights 
with respect to income protection, is often distinguished from other welfare state 
arrangements, such as rights on adequate housing, education, or social work (Heerma van 
Voss and Klosse, 2010). Taken together, these income protection rights and other welfare 
state arrangements form the heart of the Dutch welfare state. This section presents a brief 
state of the art of the welfare state rights in the Netherlands, according to the kind of 
rights (statutory rights, social security rights and other welfare state rights), the way in 
which these rights can be realized (cash benefits, in-kind benefits or services) and the 
organization of those rights in the law. First we will examine some general features of 
Dutch welfare state rights.    
 
2.1 Varying welfare state rights and public safeguards 
Welfare state rights can be realized in different ways. Rights which are part of social 
security law mostly concern rights to cash benefits. However, in some cases these rights 
are realized in kind, such as provisions with respect to long-term care, or in the form of 
services such as reintegration activities. Other welfare state rights, such as education and 
housing rights, mostly involve in-kind benefits. Yet, these welfare provisions also include 
cash benefits, such as study grants and rent subsidies. These rights, irrespective of 
whether they concern claims on cash benefits, in-kind benefits or services, can all be 
characterized as individual claim rights. That is, the rightful claimant is entitled to certain 
provisions which, in most cases, are delivered by a public body.   
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Welfare rights can also be differentiated in other ways. For example, whilst most 
rights are laid down in public law, some rights are fixed in private law. In addition, 
welfare rights which are part of public law may involve either laws passed by the national 
parliament, administrative measures or local acts, such as municipal regulations. Another 
differentiation concerns the regulation of welfare rights in either (private or public) 
statutory law or in collective agreements. 
To a great extent, the specific regulation of welfare state rights reflects the 
differences in allocation of welfare services. That is, they show us if: 
 
- the rights are to be realized by public bodies and/or other private institutions 
and actors, 
- if either central or decentralized public bodies are involved, 
- and how the scope of competence is divided between the government and the 
social partners.  
 
It must be noted, however, that the regulation of a specific welfare state right claim by 
public law does not mean that these claim rights are entirely protected by public law. For 
example, whereas the right to sufficient health insurance has been laid down in public 
law, citizens have to realize their right claims against private health insurers in civil law 
procedures.   
At this point, we should address the question concerning the implications of these 
differentiations for the safeguards of welfare state arrangements. First of all, with respect 
to individual claim rights, we can make a broad distinction between individual claim 
rights in administrative law procedures and individual claim rights in civil law procedures. 
In administrative law, citizens who do not agree with a decision taken by a public body 
(including decisions originating from municipalities, welfare agencies, and functional 
decentralized institutions) can lodge an objection in writing. They can additionally 
motivate their objections in a public hearing. If these citizens also disagree with the 
decision on their objection (by the public body), they can go to the court and 
subsequently to the court of appeal (Central Appeals Tribunal). Yet, not all individual 
claim rights are fixed in public law. Some rights are fixed in private law, such as the right 
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to 70 per cent of the wages during the first two years an employee is not able to work due 
to sickness. In case the employer does not pay, the employee can go to the civil court and 
appeal two times to a higher court. Citizens should also follow the civil law procedure if 
it comes to a dispute on the interpretation of a collective arrangement. 
 There are some important differences between the civil and administrative law 
procedure though. In the first place, public appeal is more accessible, because in first 
instance citizens do not need to go to court, but can lodge an objection in writing. In 
addition, the costs of higher appeal are lower in an administrative law procedure and the 
administrative law judge plays a more active role than civil law judges. That is, whereas 
the administrative law judge actively attempts to construct the material truth, the civil law 
judge seeks to construct something which has to count as the truth between the parties. 
The administrative law procedure also contains some General Principles of Good 
Administration, such as the prohibition of arbitrariness and a prohibition on the 
detournement de pouvoir. In sum, compared to the civil law procedure, the administrative 
law procedure is more accessible to citizens and holds more safeguards. The safeguards 
of welfare state rights will be further addressed in the next section as we discuss some 
recent changes in this respect.  
 
2.2 Constitutional welfare state rights 
In the Dutch Constitution of 1983 the following articles are related to social rights:   
 
Article 18: Legal aid 
Article 19: Employment, protection thereof and free choice of labor 
Article 20: Social security 
Article 21: Environment and housing conditions  
Article 22: Public health, housing and social and cultural flourishing 
Article 23: Education 
 
Of these Constitutional rights, most of them point at individual rights.
2
 Article 20 (3) is 
important in this respect as it provides a right to social assistance for all Dutch citizens. It 
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 Dutch Constitutional rights have both horizontal and vertical effect.   
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should be noticed, however, that article 20 does not entail a claim right for social 
assistance. Instead it charges the State with the positive obligation to provide for basic 
social assistance for needy Dutch citizens living in the Netherlands. Therefore it could be 
argued that the Constitutional right to social assistance is only important in a theoretical 
sense. In fact, the governmental task to legislate dominates. Thus, claim rights are 
generally founded on other regulations (Klosse, 2012). Another important feature of 
article 20 is that it does not hold that social security should be organized by the State. It 
has even been suggested that it ‘is more plausible to interpret article 20 as implying that 
the right to social security could also be implemented by means of contractual rights and 
obligations between citizens and private parties’ (Vonk and Marseille, 2010: 372). 
Other Constitutional social rights also stipulate that rights have to be regulated by 
legislation, such as article 18 which refers to the right to legal aid and article 23 which 
refers to the right to state financed private education such as denominational education. 
Finally, article 19 orders the government to encourage sufficient employment. On the 
other hand, article 19 (3) does stipulate a right to a freedom with respect to the choice of 
employment. It is further important to notice that article 120 of the Constitution forbids 
the judge to test a law against the Constitution. Hence, the judge cannot overrule the 
legislator. Still, as will be explained in section 5, the Dutch judge may test national law 
against international treaties.   
 
2.3 Social security law 
As mentioned above, social security law can be distinguished from other welfare state 
arrangements. This subsection discusses individual claim rights which are laid down in 
social security law. Claim rights related to other welfare state arrangements are examined 
in section 2.4. 
 
2.3.1. Income protection schemes  
To income protection schemes we reckon social insurances and provisions which protect 
employees against the risk of income loss because of the risk of unemployment, disability, 
aging or the death of the breadwinner. First, we will consider the differences between 
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national insurances, social insurances and social provisions. Subsequently, we will 
address specific income protection schemes.  
Income protection schemes may involve national insurances, social insurances, 
social provisions and tax credits. These insurances, provisions and tax credits can be 
distinguished in diverse ways. First of all, some social provisions such as social 
assistance can be distinguished from social insurances, because of its complementary 
function. That is, citizens are only entitled to social assistance provisions in case they do 
not have a right to social insurances. The distinction between employees insurances, 
national insurances and social provisions is further important because it tells us how the 
arrangements are financed. While social insurances are financed by contributions of 
employers and employees, national insurances are financed by mandatory contributions 
and tax payments and, finally, social provisions are entirely financed by tax payments. 
Furthermore, the distinction between social provisions on the one hand and (social and 
national) insurances on the other, informs us on the governmental influence on the 
organization of these arrangements. Then, whereas most social provisions are directly 
governed by the government, which stipulates the policy, legislates, and implements the 
provision, social insurances are implemented by functionally decentralized public bodies, 
which are characterized by a diminished governmental involvement. The most important 
functional decentralized public bodies are in the first place, UWV, which implements 
social insurances, such as the unemployment insurance and the disability insurance and, 
secondly, SVB which implements so-called national insurances, such as the old age 
benefits and child allowances. A relatively new instrument entails tax-credits. These are 
publicly financed funds, which are implemented by tax authorities. Citizens can only 
effectuate these rights in case they pay enough taxes. 
Let us start with the protection against the risk of unemployment. The 
unemployment insurance (WW) is stipulated in public law and insures employees against 
the risk of income loss after getting unemployed. Employees who have been working for 
at least six months preceding their unemployment can claim unemployment benefits at 
UWV. The benefits amount to 75 per cent of the wage during the first two months and 70 
per cent of the wage thereafter. The length of the right to benefits depends on the age and 
employment record and is at a maximum of 38 months.  
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In contrast to the protection of income loss due to unemployment, the risk of 
income loss due to disability is for most employees regulated by civil law, at least during 
the first two years when the employer is obliged to pay 70 per cent of the wage. Some 
(former) employees have right to a social insurance in case of sickness in this period 
(ZW).
3
 After two years employees may claim a disability benefit (WIA) at the UWV, 
which amounts to a maximum of 75 per cent of the wage. Although claim rights on 
disability allowances are based upon a public act, the implementation of the disability 
insurance is either organized in administrative law or in civil law. That is, if the employer 
decides to become an own-risk bearer, he/she will in most cases conclude a private 
insurance. However, UWV remains responsible for the allowance payments: UWV pays 
the allowances and passes the costs on to the employer. These issues will be further 
addressed in section 4.1.  
Unemployment and disability benefits, whether paid by UWV or by the individual 
employer, are sometimes completed as a result of collective agreements. Most collective 
agreements stipulate that employers pay 100 per cent of previous earned income during 
the first year that an employee is unable to work due to disability. In addition, in case 
allowances fall below the social assistance level, benefits may be completed by a social 
provision that, by way of exception, is executed by UWV (TW).  
Employees who are no longer entitled to unemployment or disability benefits and 
whose income fall below the social assistance level may be entitled to social assistance 
benefits (WWB). There are some special forms of social assistance for elderly and partly 
disabled former employees (IOAW) and self-employed (IOAZ). Citizens may also 
invoke additional rights to cash or in-kind benefits, in case their income has not exceeded 
the social minimum in the last 5 years or in case of special needs. All (social assistance) 
provisions are implemented by the municipalities, who are authorized to formulate more 
detailed regulations with respect to those provisions. As a result, safety-net regulations 
may differ between municipalities. Next to these social assistance provisions 
implemented by municipalities, there exists a special public provision, financed by tax 
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 For example, employees who have become sick just before or after the contract ended, can claim sickness 
allowances at the UWV. Also pregnant women, who are sick because of their pregnancy can claim sickness 
allowances, which, in contrast to other (former) employees, amount to 100 percent of the wage.   
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incomes, for young disabled with and without a work history, which is implemented by 
UWV (Wajong).  
Finally, we have to address two important national insurances which are 
implemented by the SVB and which are fixed in public law, the ANW and the AOW. The 
ANW stipulates a right to cash benefits for surviving relatives of deceased insured 
persons. Secondly, the risk of income loss because of old age is covered by the AOW, a 
national insurance which provides for a minimum income for citizens who reach the age 
of 65 (first pillar).
4
 In most cases former employees are also entitled to occupational 
pension schemes which are organized by the social partners (second pillar). Others, 
especially self-employed, may have concluded additional individual pension insurances 
with private insurers (third pillar).  
 
2.3.2. Rights with respect to active labor market policy  
Active labor market policies are aimed at increasing labour market participation and at 
reducing the amount of claim rights on public and private income protection schemes. 
Activation programs such as public employment services and training are also expected 
to improve the match between demand and supply on the labour market. Active labour 
market policies mainly apply to people who are unemployed or who receive disability 
benefits. In the case of disability, these rights can be invoked against a private employer, 
during the first two years of disability. The employer is obliged to reintegrate the disabled 
employer in his/her own company or in another company. If, according to the employee, 
the employer does not fulfill his reintegration duties, he can start a civil law procedure 
against his/her employer. Reintegration obligations of employers who have chosen to 
become own-risk bearers stretch beyond the first two years of sickness. This employer 
may also impose sanctions on the employee if the employee neglects his duty to 
reintegrate. If the employee disagrees with the employer he can start an administrative 
law procedure against the employer. The own-risk bearer is thus considered a public body. 
Employees of employers who have not chosen to become an own-risk bearer (the 
majority) can invoke rights to reintegration after two years of disability against UWV. 
                                                          
4




The same is true for recipients of unemployment benefits. Recipients of social assistance 
benefits (WWB), surviving relatives benefits (ANW) and unemployed citizens who are 
not entitled to public benefits (so called ‘Nuggers’)
5
 may claim rights on reintegration 
and employment-finding instruments against municipalities.   
 
2.3.3. Rights related to children and other dependents 
The Dutch welfare state includes a broad range of children-related welfare state 
arrangements. These arrangements can be divided in two broad categories. First of all, 
rights to cash benefits to cover the costs of children, and, secondly, rights with respect to 
the reconciliation of work and private life. Starting with the first category, the most 
important cash benefit designed to cover the costs of children, concerns the right for all 
citizens on child allowance, the AKW, which is a national insurance. In addition, 
households with children may be entitled to tax credits. 
 Rights with respect to the reconciliation of work and private life concern, first of 
all, rights on subsidy for day care. Other rights are regulated in the Work and Care act. 
According to this act, pregnant women can claim a right to a pregnancy allowance 
according to 100 per cent of their income during 16 weeks. This allowance is financed by 
employers and employees. Self-employed women also have a right to publicly funded 
pregnancy allowances, which, at the most, amounts to a minimum wage. In addition, 
employees have a right to paternity leave of maximum 26 weeks. Employees are also 
entitled to 6 weeks leave in the period of 12 months in order to take care of family 
members and partners suffering from a life-threatening illness. They are however not 
entitled to either remuneration or an allowance during this period, unless this has been 
agreed upon in a collective agreement.  
 
2.3.4 Rights related to health and long-term care 
According to the Dutch health insurance law (ZVW), a national insurance, citizens do not 
only have a right to be admitted to health insurances, they are also obliged to insure 
themselves for medical expenses. To comply with these obligations citizens have to enter 
a contract with a private health insurer. The health insurance is financed by the insured 
                                                          
5
 For example, because their partner earns above minimum wage.                         
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persons and the employers and for a small part by the national government, which covers 
the insurance costs of children under 18. Citizens with low income have a right to 
compensation for the costs against the national government, a social provision which is 
implemented by the tax authorities (Zorgtoeslag).  
In addition to rights to a health insurance, citizens are entitled to benefits (cash 
and in kind) related to long-term care. These rights are fixed in the AWBZ, which is a 
national insurance. The AWBZ is executed by private health insurers, which exercise a 
statutory competence. A public body (CIZ) judges the right to provisions. Since 2007 
some provisions are regulated in a new public act (WMO) which is implemented by the 
municipalities. The WMO stipulates rights to services for handicapped persons and 
persons suffering from a chronic psychiatric disease. The provisions vary from in-kind 
provisions, such as a wheelchair, to cash benefits, such as individual budgets. Further 
conditions are stipulated in municipality regulations. 
  
2.4 Other welfare state arrangements: education, housing and social support 
Apart from the rights which are laid down in social security law, citizens can also invoke 
rights to affordable education, housing and rights to social support/social work. This 
section will examine these ‘other’ welfare state rights.  
 The Compulsory Education Act stipulates that children between the age of 5 and 
16 years old have to be educated. Thus, the Constitutional right to education (see section 
2.2) has been translated into an obligation. Next to this obligation, parents with low 
income are entitled to compensation in the education costs for children younger than 18 
years old in secondary and vocational education (WTOS). In addition, students between 
18 en 30 are entitled to a study grant (WSF). The level of the grant is determined by the 
income of the parents. Also, according to some collective agreements employees may 
invoke rights to the financing of education and vocational training.    
  The Dutch Constitution does not stipulate a right to housing, it only obliges the 
government to promote sufficient housing facilities. This obligation is further elaborated 
in rules which open up the housing market for citizens with a low income. For example, 
according to the housing legislation (huisvestingswet), citizens are entitled to free 
settlement. This right can, however, be restricted in the interest of a well-balanced and 
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just distribution of housing accommodation. In order to keep housing affordable, the 
housing legislation further stipulates that housing corporations have to reserve 90 per cent 
of the houses with a low rent for citizens with lower incomes.
6
 Further legislative acts on 
housing are delegated to the municipalities, which can stipulate additional conditions 
with respect to the application for an affordable house. In addition to the obligation to 
promote sufficient housing facilities, the access to affordable housing is facilitated by 
public rent subsidies (huurtoeslag). The subsidies are implemented by the national tax 
authorities. The level of these social provisions for social housing depends on the 
household income and the rent. 
Finally, rights to social support including public mental health care and social work 
are regulated in a public act, the WMO. According to this act, the municipalities should 
delegate social support activities as much as possible to third parties. The WMO also 
stipulates that some assigned municipalities receive money for the organization of 
reception centers for the homeless and the care and treatment of addicts. These 
municipalities are ordered to guarantee that these centers and provisions are accessible 
for all persons living in the Netherlands. Thus the WMO indirectly lays down a right to 
have access to reception centers for homeless and to provisions with respect to the care 
and treatment of addicts.    
 
3. Social expenditures and other welfare state indicators 
To provide an overview of the long-term developments of the Dutch welfare state 
programs, we use a number of quantitative indicators. First, we present the developments 
in social expenditures, for which we use data from the OECD Social Expenditure 
database (OECD, 2012). This database contains expenditure data on a number of social 
policy areas. Policies are classified as social when two conditions are simultaneously 
satisfied (Adema et al., 2011). First, they have to be intended to serve a social purpose. 
The main social policy areas included are old-age, survivors, incapacity-related benefits, 
health, family, active labour market policies, unemployment, housing and a category of 
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 In 2013 the maximum rent for social housing is €681,02 and the maximum annual income for households 
applying for these houses is €34.229. Once people live in these houses, the maximum income does not 
apply anymore.  
15 
 
other social policy areas such as social assistance.
7
 Both expenditures on cash benefits 
and on benefits in kind are included. Second, programs have to involve either inter-
personal redistribution or compulsory participation. The database contains expenditures 
on public and private social security programs. The distinction between public and 
private social security is based on the institution which controls the financial flows, 
namely public agencies or private bodies. Private programs include mandatory and 
voluntary programs.
8
 For the Netherlands, private social expenditures mainly consist of 
expenditures on old age programs, incapacity related programs and health care.   
In the tables presented below, social expenditures are expressed as a percentage of 
GDP or as a percentage of total government expenditures. These ratios are conventional 
in the international comparative literature, because they provide a number of advantages 
compared to absolute expenditure levels. Most importantly, these ratios give an 
indication of the financial efforts on welfare state programs relative to the national 
income or to the total government expenditures, while factors such as inflation or changes 
in the population size do not complicate comparisons over time or across countries.      
Table 1 shows the developments in the total gross public and private expenditures 
on social programs as a percentage of GDP in the Netherlands. Public social expenditures 
have decreased from 24.8 per cent of GDP in 1980 to 23.2 per cent in 2009. Changes in 
social expenditures reflect both discretionary policy changes and changes in the number 
of beneficiaries as the results of ageing of the population or changes in unemployment 
levels due to cyclical factors (Van Vliet, 2010). The private social expenditures increased 
from 4.1 per cent of GDP to 6.7 per cent in 2009. The relatively strong increase (63 per 
cent) in the private social expenditures is mainly due to higher expenditures on old age 
programs such as pension provision. In addition to a public pay-as-you-go system 
(AOW), the Netherlands have a relatively large funded system. The relative share of 
private supplementary pensions in the total pension provision, both mandatory pension 
schemes (second pillar) and voluntary pension schemes (third pillar), has been growing 
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 The dataset does not contain expenditure data on social assistance specifically.  
8
 Because voluntary private social security arrangements are classified as ‘social’, they have to contain an 
element of interpersonal redistribution. This implies that purely private insurance which is the result of 
direct market transactions by individual people given their individual risk profiles is not included. 
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(Goudswaard et al., 2010). Over the whole period, the total social expenditures increased 
with 1 percentage point to 29.9 per cent of GDP in 2009.   
 
Table 1. Public and private social expenditures as percentage of GDP, 1980 - 2009 
 
1980 1990 2000 2009 
Change 
1980 - 2009 
      
Public 24.8 25.6 19.8 23.2 -1.6 
Private 4.1 6.0 7.4 6.7 2.6 
      
Total 28.9 31.6 27.2 29.9 1.0 
 
Source: OECD Social Expenditure Database (2012). 
 
 
Table 2 shows that between 1980 en 2009, public expenditures on social policies amount 
around 45 per cent of the total government expenditures. Furthermore, Table 2 presents 
social expenditures at the program level. Public expenditures on old age have remained 
fairly stable. Since the 1990s, expenditures on programs for survivors have considerably 
decreased. This reflects the aforementioned major reform of the Survivor Act, the ANW, 
in the 1990s. Expenditures on incapacity related programs are strongly decreased from 
11.8 per cent of total government expenditures in 1980 to 6 per cent of total government 
expenditures in 2009. This is the result of a number of major policy reforms since the 
1990s, which we referred to in the introduction. The public expenditures on health care 
show an increase of roughly 65 per cent; from 9.3 per cent of the total government budget 
in 1980 to 15.3 per cent in 2009. Empirical analyses indicate that this increase is mainly 
the result of technological progress in the health care sector and of the ageing of the 
population (CPB, 2007). 
Expenditures on family policies seem to have decreased between 1980 and 2009. 
However, the annual data (not shown in Table 2) reveal that these expenditures follow a 
quite fluctuating path rather than a decreasing trend, as the presented data years might 
suggest. In 2007 for instance, 4.3 per cent of total government expenditures was spent on 
family policies, showing the increased government expenditures on child care during the 
mid-2000s. Furthermore, it should be noted that a number of family policies are 
17 
 
instrumented as deductions on the tax income, such as the tax credits we mentioned in 
section 2.3.3. Because the social expenditures presented are gross public expenditures, 
they do not reflect tax deductions.
9
  
Between 1980 and 2000, expenditures on active labour market policies increased 
considerably. After 2000, these expenditures decreased again. As mentioned above, these 
expenditure ratios are to some extent a function of the number of unemployed people. 
Hence, these lower expenditures on active labour market policies are partly the result of 
lower unemployment rates in the period 2000-2009. Furthermore, this decrease in 
spending also reflects the reduction of the activation budget by the government with the 
introduction of the new social assistance act (WWB, see section 4) (Van Berkel, 2006). 
Nevertheless, expenditures on activation programs in 2009 are more than twice as high as 
in 1980, indicating that labour market policies have become more aimed at activation. 
The expenditures on unemployment protection have increased between 1980 and 
1990, but they have decreased again after 1990. As is the case for activation programs, 
expenditures on unemployment benefits strongly depend on the unemployment rate. To 
explore the changes in the level of unemployment benefits, we use net unemployment 
benefit replacement rates. The net unemployment replacement rate is the ratio of the net 
income from unemployment benefits to the net income from work.
10
 Data are taken from 
the Unemployment replacement rates dataset (Van Vliet and Caminada, 2012). The 
measure indicates the generosity of unemployment benefits in the initial phase of 
unemployment.
11
 Figure 1 shows the net unemployment benefit replacement rates 
between 1971 and 2009. Over the whole period, the net income for unemployed people 
has become lower. A major reform of the unemployment benefits has taken place in 
1987. As a result, the level of net benefits dropped considerably. Finally, Table 2 shows 





                                                          
9
 The OECD provides net social expenditures, but not at the programme level.  
10
 The calculations assume a worker, aged 40, who earns the average production worker wage.  
11
 A limitation of this indicator is that it does not take the duration of the benefits into account.  
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Table 2. Public social expenditures as a percentage of total government expenditures, 
1980 – 2009 
 
Program 1980 1990 2000 2009 
Change  
1980 - 2009 
      
Old age 11.1 11.5 11.9 11.3 0.2 
Survivors 1.5 1.7 0.9 0.4 -1.1 
Incapacity related 11.8 11.5 8.8 6.0 -5.8 
Health 9.3 9.8 11.4 15.3 6.0 
Family 4.5 3.0 3.4 3.3 -1.2 
Active labour market programs 1.0 2.3 3.3 2.4 1.4 
Unemployment 2.9 4.6 2.9 2.8 -0.1 
Housing 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.2 
Other social policy areas 2.3 1.5 1.4 2.6 0.3 
      
Total  44.9 46.5 44.8 44.8 -0.1 
 
Source: OECD Social Expenditure Database (2012). 
 
 
Figure 1. Net unemployment benefit replacement rates, 1971 - 2009 
 
 
















Public social expenditures as a percentage of the total government expenditures are also 
presented in Figure 2, where we make a distinction between expenditures on cash 
benefits and expenditures on benefits in kind. Between 1980 and 2009, the expenditures 
on cash benefits have decreased, whilst the expenditures on benefits in kind have 
increased. As a result, the share of expenditures on benefits in kind has increased from 
roughly a quarter of the public social expenditures in 1980 to roughly half of them in 
2009. This indicates a relative shift from the provision of welfare state programs through 
cash benefits to a more services oriented welfare state. In line with the data presented in 
Table 2, the decrease in the expenditures on cash benefits is mainly the result of 
decreased expenditures on survivor benefits, capacity related benefits, family benefits and 
unemployment benefits. The increased financial resources for benefits in kind are mainly 
spent on residential care and home-help for the elderly, rehabilitation services for 
disabled people and health care.  
 
 
















Because expenditures on education are usually not classified as social expenditures, we 
present them separately. Furthermore, we use data from Eurostat instead of OECD data 
here, because Eurostat has more data on expenditures on education available than the 
OECD (Eurostat, 2013). Table 3 presents the development of public expenditure on 
education as a percentage of GDP. Between 1995 and 2009, the expenditures on primary 
and secondary education increased, whilst the expenditures on tertiary education slightly 
decreased. This decrease is not a result of fewer students, because the number of students 
in tertiary education actually increased with more than 20 per cent in this period. Taken 
together, the total expenditures on primary, secondary and tertiary education increased 
with 0.7 per cent of GDP.   
 
 
Table 3. Public expenditure on education as percentage of GDP, 1995 - 2009  
 
 1995 2000 2005 2009 
Change 
1995 - 2009 
Primary education 1.17 1.24 1.42 1.48 0.31 
Secondary education 1.99 1.98 2.17 2.42 0.43 
Tertiary education 1.67 1.39 1.47 1.63 -0.04 
      
Sum 4.83 4.61 5.06 5.53 0.70 
 
Source: Eurostat Statistics on Education and Training (2013).  
 
 
Finally, we show the development of the income inequality in the Netherlands over the 
last few decades. Several measures can be used to study income inequality, but the Gini 
coefficient of household income is the most often used summary measure of income 
distribution. The values of the Gini coefficient range from 0 (no inequality) to 1 
(maximum inequality). Table 4 presents Gini coefficients of household incomes after 
taxes and transfers. Data are taken from the OECD (2012). Among the total population 
and the working age population, the level of income inequality has increased between the 
mid-1970s and the late-2000s. In contrast, the level of income inequality among people 
aged 65 and above has decreased since the 1990s. Interestingly, comparable trends of 
decreasing income inequality among older people have been observed in other European 
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countries as well. A tentative explanation for these trends could be that the coverage of 
private supplementary pensions has increased (Van Vliet et al., 2012). However, 
empirical research for the Netherlands has indicated that the level of income inequality 
among retirees has increased in the most recent years (between 2008 and 2013) as a result 
of a growing group of retirees with relatively low private supplementary pensions (Knoef 
et al., 2013). 
 
 
Table 4. Gini coefficient after taxes and transfers 
 










        
Total population 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.29 
Working age population:  
18 - 65 
0.26 0.27 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.30 
Retirement age population: 
above 65 
0.27 0.27 0.29 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.25 
        
 
Source: OECD Income distribution statistics (2012). 
 
 
4. Shifts in the allocation of welfare services 
The data presented in the last section indicate some major changes in the Dutch welfare 
state. Overall, the expenditures on cash benefits decreased as a result of major reforms in 
public insurances for, amongst other things, the risk of unemployment and disability in 
the 1980s en 1990s. These reforms also implied that social assistance has become more 
important as a last safety net. In addition, the data showed that expenditures on active 
labour market policies have strongly increased since the 1980s. However, after 2000 
active labour market policy expenditures have decreased, which is partly the result of a 
cut in the reintegration budgets after the introduction of the new social assistance act in 
2004 (WWB). These changes also reflect two shifts in the allocation of welfare services 
in the Netherlands which will be further examined in this section, namely the movement 
of the allocation of welfare services from the state to the employers and from the state to 
the municipalities. These new allocations of welfare services were considered crucial to 
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activate welfare recipients. We will in particular address the implications of these shifts 
for the public safeguards of welfare state provisions. In addition, section 5 examines if 
and to what extent European Union law and international treaties put limits to these shifts.  
 
4.1 From the state to employers 
As mentioned in the introduction, the report by the Buurmeijer Committee revealed how 
the corporatist organization of unemployment and disability schemes had encouraged 
welfare dependency, instead of reintegrating unemployed and disabled workers into paid 
employment (Buurmeijer Committee, 1993). This report triggered some major reforms in 
the disability and sickness schemes in the 1990s and the years 2000. One of the most 
important reforms involved the introduction of the WULBZ in 1996 which compelled 
the employer to pay 70 per cent of previous earned income during the first 52 weeks of 
disability, the so-called 7:629 Civil Act procedure. Since 2004, this employers obligation 
was further extended to a period of 104 weeks. In addition to the increased responsibility 
for the income of the sick employee, the report by the Buurmeijer Committee also 
initiated increased reintegration obligations of both employers and employees. In this 
section both changes will be examined. We will consider in particular if this new 
allocation of welfare services has affected the public safeguards for income maintenance.   
 First of all, the introduction of the WULBZ changed the legal procedures in case 
of conflicts over payments during absence due to sickness. Whereas before the 
introduction of the WULBZ in 1996 conflicts over payments were regulated in an 
administrative law procedure, after the introduction of the WULBZ, these conflicts are 
regulated in the 7:629 Civil Act procedure. As was noted in section 2.1, generally 
speaking, administrative law procedures are more accessible and offers more safeguards 
than civil law procedures. For example, in administrative law procedures citizens do not 
need to go to court immediately, but can lodge an objection in writing. Administrative 
law procedures further contain some General Principles of Good Administration which 
offer specific protection to citizens, such as the prohibition of arbitrariness and a 
prohibition on ‘detournement de pouvoir’. The administrative law judge also plays a 
more active role compared to civil law judges.  
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In addition to these general differences the 7:629 Civil Act procedure also 
contains some specific features. In the first place, in most cases legal charges are lower in 
public procedures compared to civil procedures. Yet, in the 7:629 Civil Act procedures, 
legal charges are reduced. As a result, the costs of the 7:629 Civil Act procedures are 
comparable to the costs of administrative law procedures. Hence, in this respect the 
accessibility of civil law procedures are similar to administrative law procedures. On the 
other hand, however, the 7:629 Civil Act procedure contains more obstacles for 
employees seeking justice. For example, unlike administrative law procedures, civil law 
procedures do not require mandatory legal representation. In addition, the burden of proof 
to show that the employee is sick has been increased in 7:629 Civil Act procedures, 
which has made it more difficult for employees to win a case.  
Still, the most important change concerns the introduction of a so called second 
opinion requirement from a medical doctor of UWV before a 7:629 Civil Act procedure 
can be started at all. Empirical research shows that after the introduction of the second 
opinion the number of cases on wage/benefit claims during periods of sickness has 
diminished enormously (Minderhoud et al., 1999; Huizinga, 2010). It seems plausible to 
conclude that the second opinion requirement has had a deterrent effect on employees 
wanting to start a civil procedure. The decrease of wage/benefit claims may also be due 
to the employees’ fear that a civil law procedure has a negative impact on their 
relationship with the employer. Before 1996 the risk that the relationship with the 
employer would be affected was much smaller, as sick employees would not start a 
procedure against their employer but against the industrial insurance board.  
Possibly, the responsibility of employers to pay 70 per cent of the wage during 
periods of sickness and the second opinion requirement have also increased employment 
termination, because the financial incentives to terminate employment have increased 
substantially. In addition, whereas UWV requires 3 weeks to deliver a second opinion, a 
labour dispute easily arises in case the employee does not work during this period and the 
employer, following the advice of the health and safety officer, holds that the employee is 
not sick. Indeed, research has shown that juridical cases that involved a second opinion 
delivered by UWV often concerned dismissal cases (Huizinga, 2010). Yet, it remains 
difficult to investigate the ‘real’ reason for employment termination.  
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All in all, the introduction of the WULBZ seems to have decreased the public 
safeguards of wage/benefit claims during periods of illness. On the other hand, regarding 
the reduction of absence trough illness
12
, the argument can also be put forward that the 
public safeguards have increased, because the employers have more incentives to re-
integrate their employees.
13
   
In addition to the privatisation of the sickness insurance, the report by the 
Buurmeijer Commission also initiated new incentives for the employer to prevent 
employees becoming dependent of the disability insurance (WAO/WIA) after two years 
of sickness. In the remainder of this section we examine if and to what extent the Pemba 
act of 1997 has affected public safeguards to income protection in case of disability.   
As a result of the Pemba act employers became fully responsible for the risk of 
long-term disability. The premium employer has to pay for the public insurance varies by 
industry. The Pemba act also introduced the possibility of employers to become an own-
risk bearer with respect to the risk of long-term disability. In 2010, 27 per cent of the 
employers had chosen to become own-risk bearers (Veerman, 2011). This means that 
these employers have chosen to pay the disability benefits by themselves. Since the 
introduction of the reformed disability act (WIA) in 2006, the responsibility for 
employers who have chosen to bear the risk of disability has been extended to the period 
after the contract with the employee has ended. In practice, next to the old category 
UWV-insurants, a new category of disability insurants have emerged, namely employees 
who are insured by an own risk bearer (ORB - insurants). What are the consequences of 
this shift of the allocation of welfare services (disability benefits) from a state actor 
(UWV) to a private employer?   
First of all, it is important to notice that the employer who chooses to be an own-
risk bearer, becomes a public body in the sense of the General Administrative Law Act, 
which means that ORB-insurants follow the same objection and appeal procedure fixed in 
administrative law as UWV- insurants. The Act on Independent Public Bodies stipulates 
in this regard an important safeguard: public power must be executed independently from 
                                                          
12
 Absence through illness has decreased from more than 6 per cent of the working population in the early 
1990s to a little bit more than 4 per cent in 2011 (CBS statline).  
13
 Although it still might be argued that the reduction in absence trough illness has also been due to rising 
termination cases.  
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other duties. Yet, in the literature the question has been raised whether the own-risk 
bearer is able to differentiate between his obligation to behave himself as an impartial 
public body and his role as an employer (regulated by private law). Moreover, not only 
the private interests of the employer may impede his role as an impartial public body, 
also ignorance with respect to the statutory periods may prevent employees from 
proceeding against their employer (Roozendaal, 2006). These latter fears are sustained by 
empirical evidence. In 2010 for instance, there were hardly any legal proceedings 
between ORB-insurants and their employers before the public court, despite the fact that 
own-risk bearers imposed roughly 200 sanctions (Veerman, 2011). In the literature, it has 
therefore been proposed to test in advance if an employer is capable of performing the 
duties of an Independent Public Body (Rijpkema and Tollenaar, 2012) .  
We can also point at some differences between own-risk bearers and UWV which 
may affect the public safeguards of ORB-insurants. For example, unlike the sanctioning 
power of UWV, the sanctioning power of own risk bearers is not regulated by a legal 
act.
14
 In addition, reintegration rights of ORB – insurants differ from those of UWV- 
insurants as the latter group has the right to all kinds of reintegration support by UWV 
which is not accessible to ORB- insurants. Finally, whereas both UWV and the own-risk 
bearers have duties with respect to the reintegration of the disabled employee, the 
National Inspection agency only controls the legitimacy and effectiveness of the activities 
of UWV whose reintegration obligations has additionally been stipulated in detail 
(Roozendaal, 2006). 
In sum, notwithstanding that it is most likely that the privatization operations have 
had a positive effect on the reintegration of sick and disabled employees, it seems fair to 
conclude that both the WULBZ and the Pemba Act have affected the public safeguards 
for (some) sick and disabled employees in a negative way. In case of disagreement 
between the sick/disabled employee and the (former) employer, civil law procedures have 
replaced administrative law procedures which offer less safeguards. In addition, the 
second opinion requirement seems to have had a threshold effect for employees to start 
procedures in case of disagreement. Moreover, sanctions and reintegration obligations of 
                                                          
14
 The sanctioning power of UWV is regulated by ‘maatregelenbesluit’ which stipulates what kind of 
sanctions (fines and measures) should be imposed.  
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employers who have chosen to become own-risk bearers are less well regulated. Perhaps 
most important, it seems likely that the transference of procedures from public law to 
civil law has contributed to a conflict of interests as a result of which the public 
safeguards of the involved employees have deteriorated.   
 
4.2 From the state to municipalities 
A second shift in the allocation of welfare services which we will examine in more detail, 
entails the shift from the state to municipalities. We will focus on this process of 
decentralization of social assistance provisions which has taken place since the 
introduction of the new social assistance act, WWB, in 2004. An important goal of this 
new act is the activation of welfare recipients and their reintegration to paid employment. 
For illustration, the literal translation of the name of this act is ‘Act Employment and 
Income’. This trend is also important regarding recent welfare state retrenchments as a 
result of which the WWB has become the main source of income protection in case of 
unemployment for many so called outsiders on the labour market.
15
  
The WWB delegates rules with respect to reintegration, sanctions and extra 
allowances to municipal regulations. In addition, the WWB has given local officials more 
discretion with respect to, amongst other things, reintegration measures and sanctions. As 
a result, rights to social assistance may differ between municipalities and may even 
depend on the appointed official. An advantage of decentralization and municipal 
discretion is that it encourages tailor made provisions. On the other hand, however, 
decentralization may give rise to inequalities between municipalities which are due to 
arbitrary differences in the interpretation of national policy. In this respect, Van Berkel 
raised the question if ‘social assistance recipients in municipalities that adopt a more 
disciplinary approach [are] less deserving than in others?’ (Van Berkel, 2006). In addition, 
the question can be raised to what extent different treatments for individual recipients 
reflect different individual capabilities and potentials. In view of these complications it 
                                                          
15
 This growing importance of social assistance provisions can also be observed in other continental welfare 
states, which has caused a social divide between the so called insiders on the labor market who have 
indefinite contracts and are entitled to unemployment and disability insurances and outsiders on the labor 
market who have fixed term contracts for short periods or work on commission and who (quickly) fall back 
on social assistance in case of unemployment and disability. Welfare state retrenchments have increased 
these divides. See Palier (2010: 359).  
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has been proposed in the literature that differences between municipalities should always 
be reducible to conscious and explicit considerations of municipal bodies. It has further 
been argued that these municipal differences due to municipal discretion tend to be 
relatively small and they are subjected to administrative law and the General Principles of 
Good Administration (Vonk, 2012: 2127).   
The decentralized financing system that accompanied the introduction of the 
WWB gave rise to further changes. The Dutch state hoped that financial responsibility 
would increase the incentives for municipalities to reduce social assistance dependency. 
Before the introduction of the WWB in 2004 municipalities bore only financial 
responsibility for reintegration programs. The reintegration performance of municipalities 
was assessed on both the number of job-entries realized and the number of trajectories 
realized. Under the new financing system municipalities receive two budgets from the 
national authorities. One budget for benefit payments and one budget for active labour 
market policies. At the same time the available budgets for reintegration programs have 
decreased. If municipalities spend less on benefits than the amount they received from 
this specific budget they may keep these funds. However in case there is deficit the 
municipalities have to fill the shortage from their own budget. With respect to the 
reintegration budget 25 per cent of the budget which has not been spend may be carried 
forward to the next year.  
Blommesteijn et al. have summarized some adverse effects of the new financing 
system, which they characterize as ‘quick wins rather than long-term investments’ 
(Blommesteijn et al., 2012):  
a. Stringent admission policy. People who would have been entitled to social 
assistance under the National Assistance Act which preceded the WWB are now 




b. Artificial volume decrease. Reintegration budgets are used for wage subsidies, as 
a result of which the volume of welfare recipients were reduced. Thus the income 
budget is reduced without increasing the regular work participation.  
                                                          
16
 Part of the applicants who are denied access have entered the Wajong, a provision for young disabled 
persons which is executed by the state. 
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c. Selective client approach. Municipalities use reintegration budgets for people who 
are likely to find work –with some support- as soon as possible, as a result of 
which other welfare recipients at a larger distance to the labour market do not 
receive reintegration activities.  
 
Above all, this ‘quick wins’ approach has encouraged the introduction of so called Work 
First programs. Most municipalities believed these programs would contribute to cost 
reduction (Research voor Beleid, 2008; Sol et al., 2007). In fact, in 2009 88 per cent of 
the Dutch municipalities carried out Work First programs (Borgers and Lemmens, 2009). 
The WWB provides the legal basis for Work First programs as it allows municipalities to 
enforce welfare recipients to participate in labor activities, without receiving ‘normal 
wages’ for a maximum of four years. Work First programs may entail real labor or labor 
activities which are exercised in a simulated surrounding. Other variants are also possible 
such as work programs combined with supportive courses. In most cases, the welfare 
recipients maintain their allowance as a form of remuneration. It is, however, also 
possible that they receive (subsidized) wages.  
With respect to activation policies, such as Work First programs, researchers 
distinguish a ‘carrot’ and a ‘stick’ approach. Whereas the carrot refers to investments in 
human capital, which increase the opportunities of welfare recipients on the labor market, 
the stick refers to obligatory participation in (work)programs to make welfare 
dependency less attractive (Graversen and Van Ours, 2008). The increased emphasis on 
cost reduction in municipalities, together with the cuts in reintegration budgets suggest 
that compared to the earlier social assistance law (Abw) the ‘stick’ approach has become 
more important in municipal policies. For example, research has shown that after the 
introduction of the WWB the number of schooling programs offered within WWB 
activation policies has decreased (IWI, 2007). In addition, municipalities have argued that 
cost reductions imply that finding the shortest route to work has become a priority (Work 
First). Hence, improving the labor market position of welfare recipients is not an 
independent aim of activation policies (Research voor Beleid, 2008). 
The stick approach implies, amongst other things, that Work First activities are 
linked to sanctions, which are, above all, used to incentivize welfare recipients who miss 
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the motif to work (Research voor Beleid, 2008; Sol et al., 2007). In this respect it must be 
noticed that the WWB has allowed the municipalities far reaching sanction rights which 
go beyond their earlier sanction competence. In addition, some welfare recipients 
experience enforced participation in Work First programs as a sanction itself (Sol et al., 
2007). As such Work First programs may also scare of new applicants.
17
 The legislator 
has furthered the stick approach as welfare recipients are obliged to accept any socially 
acceptable job, regardless of any former job experience or education.
18
 Instead under the 
Awb welfare recipients were obliged to accept all ‘suitable work’.   
Some studies have found that Work First programs have encouraged the outflow 
of welfare recipients in regular jobs, while, limiting the inflow of new applicants at the 
same time (Van der Klaauw and Van Ours, 2013). Other researchers, however, have 
criticized the ‘stick’ approach because it does not result in a structural participation on the 
labor market (Blommesteyn et al., 2012; Van Berkel, 2006). That is, a relatively high 
percentage of ‘former’ welfare recipients who have participated in work first projects 
have returned to the WWB (Bruttel and Sol, 2006), an effect which has even been 
acknowledged by supporters of Work First (Borgers and Lemmens, 2009). Therefore, 
critics hold that activation in the context of the WWB encourages and strengthens a 
flexible labour market, rather than investing in the capabilities of welfare recipients with 
the object of realizing a long-term labour market participation (Van Berkel, 2006).  
The decentralization of social assistance thus seems to have affected public 
safeguards in different ways. In the first place decentralization has given rise to 
inequalities between municipalities with respect to the right to social assistance. 
Secondly, the new financing system triggered a Work First approach supported by 
increased municipal sanction discretion, which on the one hand has encouraged the 
outflow of welfare recipients in regular (temporal) jobs, while, on the other hand, these 
developments have resulted in the reduction of rights to social assistance and a 
deterioration of rights to (long-term) reintegration.   
 
                                                          
17
 Some evidence is provided by Kok and Houkes (2011). In addition, a number of reports mention the need 
of further research on withdrawals of social assistance applications.  
18
 Article 8, paragraph 1 a WWB. In practice this means that the welfare recipients may only refuse socially 
unacceptable jobs such as work in the prostitution, illegal work and work which renumeration is below the 
statutory minimum wage.  
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4.3 The new allocation of social welfare services and the Dutch Constitution 
Section 2.2 argued that Constitutional social rights only contain subjective claim rights in 
a theoretical sense as social rights which are stipulated by the Constitution need further 
regulation. The Constitution is however also important in another way as, generally 
speaking, the legislator tests changes in social security law against the Constitution. The 
WULBZ was for instance tested against the Constitution.
19
 Hence, according to the Dutch 
legislator, the fact that ORB-insurants have to start civil law procedures in case of 
conflicts over wages, which may put them in a vulnerable position with respect to their 
employers, was not considered contrary to Dutch Constitutional social rights.  
On the other hand, however, the legislator has not tested the WWB against the 
Constitution. The question can therefore be raised if the WWB, in particular its sanction 
system and labor obligations, conflicts with the Constitution. Under the old social 
assistance act, the Abw, municipalities were bound to the ‘Measures Act’, a national Act 
which allowed municipalities to cut allowances varying from 5 per cent to 100 during 
maximum one month.
20
 Yet under the new social assistance act, the WWB, the only 
condition for cutting allowances is that the municipality reconsiders its decision within a 
period of three months.
21
 For the rest, municipalities are free to draft their own sanction 
regulations. The legislator thought that this new municipal discretion would increase the 
effect of the WWB. It can, however, also be argued that sanctions which amount to a 100 
per cent cut of allowances seriously affect public safeguards of a right to social assistance. 
Then, despite the fact that the court is competent to review the legality of municipal 
decisions, only a very marginal judicial review may be exercised. In addition, the Dutch 
court is not allowed to test municipality decisions against the Constitution. This raises the 
question if and how rights to social assistance can be safeguarded in case of strict 
municipal sanction policies?  
Fairly recently the Central Appeals Tribunal, the highest court in the Netherlands 
in social security cases, solved this problem in a creative way. In this case a welfare 
recipient faced a 100 per cent allowance cut during three months for refusing an offer on 
reintegration which entailed the participation in a Work First program. In its judgment the 
                                                          
19
 Parliamentary Papers 1994-95, 24 169, No.3, p. 16-20.  
20
 Article 5 Maatregelenbesluit. 
21
 Article 18 (3) 3 WWB.  
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Central Appeals Tribunal recalled that the explanatory memorandum of the WWB, holds 
that ‘anyone who cannot make it on his own, is entitled to freedom from poverty’. The 
court continued that the municipal sanction was detrimental to the character of the 
guarantee of a minimum income. Therefore, the municipality should not have sanctioned 
the appellant for more than one month.
22
 The Central Appeals Tribunal thus formulated 
some safeguards for municipal discretion by explaining the WWB in the spirit of Article 
20 of the Constitution.   
 
5. International and European law 
In the last section, we examined two shifts in the allocation of welfare services. We 
argued that the privatization of sickness and disability insurance and the decentralization 
of social assistance may have affected the right to an adequate income during periods of 
sickness and disability to work and the right to social assistance. In this section, we will 
examine to what extent international and European law provides (extra) public safeguards. 
To understand the possible impact of international law provisions it is important to notice 
that the Netherlands is a monist state. This implies that international law does not need to 
be translated into national law. This can be inferred from article 93 and 94 of the Dutch 
Constitution. Article 93 stipulates that provisions of treaties and of resolutions by 
international institutions which may be binding on all persons by virtue of their contents 
shall become binding after they have been published. And according to article 94, 
statutory regulations in force within the Netherlands shall not be applicable if such 
application is in conflict with provisions of treaties that are binding on all persons or of 
resolutions by international institutions. From relevant case law we can further infer that 
international provisions can only bind Dutch citizens in case these provisions are 
sufficiently precise and do not need further implementation in national legislation 
(Fleuren, 2004). Article 93 en 94 of the Constitution are not relevant with respect to EU 
law, as European community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the 
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 CRVB 14 March 2011 LJN BP 6843.  
23
 European Court of Justice 5 February 1963 C-26/62 (Van Gend en Loos).  
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5.1 Privatization of sickness and disability insurance 
The privatization of the Dutch sickness and disability insurance has given rise to 
comments from social rights supervisory bodies, such as the ILO Committee of Experts, 
and the European Committee on Social Rights (European Social Charter).  
According to article 25 of ILO Convention 121 on industrial accidents and 
occupational diseases, each member has to accept general responsibility for the due 
provision of the benefits provided in compliance with the Convention and for this 
purpose the Member State must take all required measures. With respect to the Dutch 
transference of the responsibility of income protection to the employers during the first 
two years of sickness in the 1990s (WULBZ), the ILO Committee of Experts recalled the 
State responsibilities ensuing from article 25 of ILO Convention 121. According to the 
Committee, article 25 implies that the State should take effective supervisory measures to 
ensure the entitlement of protected persons against all risks of abuse or of failure of the 
system.
24
 Thus the ILO Committee of Experts concluded that the private organization of 
disability insurance is not contrary to ILO Convention 121, on the condition that the State 
takes effective supervisory measures.  
However, the European Committee of Social Rights has been more critical on the 
Dutch reforms. The Committee concluded that the privatization of the sickness insurance 
in the Netherlands has definitively eroded the collective nature of social security.
25
 The 
committee referred in this respect to article 12 (3) of the European Charter, according to 
which States should ‘endeavour to raise progressively the system of social security to a 
higher level’. For the Committee WULBZ is contrary to article 12, because this article 
foresees that the principle of collective funding is a fundamental feature of the social 
security system. That is, this principle ‘ensures that the burden of risks are spread among 
the members of the community, including employers, in an equitable and economically 
appropriate manner and contributes to avoiding discrimination of vulnerable categories of 
workers’.
26
 The Dutch system would encourage risk selection as employers would be less 
willing to hire workers with a history of medical problems. In addition, the Dutch report 
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on the implementation of the WULBZ and the Pemba act did not convince the Committee 
that the ‘right to sickness and invalidity benefits is effectively secured as a social security 
right under the new system.’
27
   
It can be concluded that ILO convention 121 and Article 12 ECH allow for the 
Dutch privatization of the sickness and disability insurance as long as the State supervises 
this new allocation of welfare services. The State should in particular prevent risk 
selection by employers. According to the European Committee of Social Rights, the 
Dutch state has not fulfilled his obligations in this respect.  
 
5.2 Decentralization of social assistance 
In section 4.3 we discussed two consequences of the delegation of social assistance 
provisions to municipalities which was accompanied by an increased financial 
responsibility of municipalities for social assistance benefits. In the first place this policy 
resulted in an increased municipality discretion to impose sanctions and, secondly, this 
policy encouraged the introduction of Work First programs. Regarding these 
consequences, this section examines, first of all, if and to what extent international and 
European law provides public safeguards against cutting of allowances for longer periods. 
Secondly, we will examine if international and European law provides safeguards against 
compulsory work.   
Table 5 provides an overview of diverse relevant provisions in European and 
international law, which safeguard a right to social assistance. Let us consider first article 
34(3) of the EU Charter according to which the Union recognizes and respects the right 
to social assistance. The EU Charter has become part of European Union law since the 
Treaty of Lisbon of December 2009.
28
 According to article 52 (1), the Charter only 
applies to Member States when they are implementing Union law. Article. 52 (2) further 
provides that ‘[r]ights recognised by this Charter for which provision is made in the 
Treaties shall be exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined by those 
Treaties. In this respect, it is important to note that European Union law does not provide 
rules on social assistance, except for discrimination prohibitions. The Charter furthermore 
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distinguishes between rights and principles. Citizens can only invoke rights before the 
court. Whereas article 34 (3) must be conceived as a principle, it is unlikely that Dutch 




Table 5. Provisions in European and international law concerning social assistance 
ICESCR 
Article 11(1) The States Parties to the present covenant recognize the right of everyone 
to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, 
clothing and hauling and to the continuous improvement of living conditions (…). 
UN Convention on the Rights of the child (CRC) 
Article 27 
State Parties shall recognize the right of every child to a standard of living adequate for 
the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development.   
European Social Charter (ESC) 
Article 13 With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to social and 
medical assistance, the Parties undertake: (1) 
To ensure that any person who is without adequate resources and who is unable to 
secure such resources either by its own efforts or from other sources, in particular by 
benefits under a social security scheme, be granted adequate assistance 
Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the EU 
Article 34 (3) 
In order to combat social exclusion and poverty, the Union recognizes and respects the 
right to social and housing assistance so as to ensure a decent existence for all those who 
lack sufficient resources, in accordance with the rules laid down by Union law and 
national laws and practices.   
 
 
What about the other provisions? Article 11 (1) ICESR and article 13 ESC provide for a 
right of everyone to either an adequate standard of living (ICESR) or social assistance 
(ESC). The supervisory bodies of these Treaties have expressed some concerns with 
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respect to the WWB. For example, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights has urged the Netherlands ‘to strengthen the ongoing evaluation of the 
consequences of the Work and Social Assistance Act, so as to ensure adequate 
entitlement and duration of social assistance benefits for vulnerable members of society 
as well as support during the administrative procedure of entitlement to the benefit’ 
(Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2006). The European committee of 
social rights has even been more critical. With respect to the WWB the committee 
commented in 2006 that  
 
‘it is in conformity with Article 12 to establish a link between social assistance and willingness to seek 
work or undertake vocational training, so long as the conditions are reasonable and fully consistent with the 
objective of providing a long-lasting solution to the individual problems. However, reducing or suspending 
social assistance benefits is only compatible with the Charter if this does not deprive the individual 
concerned of means of subsistence’ (European Committee of Social Rights, 2006: 564). 
 
 The committee thus recommended a minimum threshold: sanctions may not result in 
depriving individuals of means of subsistence. Furthermore, from the 2009 report we may 
infer that the committee is not sure that Dutch social assistance recipients do not fall 
below a minimum subsistence level. The committee requests the Dutch State to provide 
information on the measures taken in case social assistance recipients refuse to ‘accept 
generally accepted work’, (..) whether the assistance is withdrawn in its entirety (..) and 
whether the withdrawal of [social] assistance amounts to the deprivation of means of 
subsistence for the person concerned.’
30
 There is no final judgment yet.
31
   
With respect to article 11 ICESR and article 13 ESC, the Central Appeals 
Tribunal decided that these provisions were not binding on all persons within the 
meaning of article 93 and 94 of the Constitution.
32
 Only article 27 CRC has been 
successfully invoked in a few cases where parents were denied social assistance 
allowances because they did not possess a valid residence permit.
33
 Hence, international 
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law only seems to provide safeguards for social assistance rights for minor children 
before the court.  
In addition to these explicit rights to social assistance, article 8 ECHR may also be 
relevant with respect to the safeguarding of the right to social assistance. According to 
article 8 ECHR, everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence. The ECtHR has held that article 8 also contains a positive 
obligation:  
 
‘[Article 8] does not merely compel the state to abstain from (..) interference: in addition to his 
primarily negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in an effective respect 
for private and family life. In addition to the negative obligation to protect the individual against 
arbitrary action by the public authorities, art 8 also contains positive obligations that is the State 




This implies that Article 8 may contain an indirect right to social assistance. Still, States 
have a margin of appreciation, which means that the State may strike a balance between 
public interest to refuse or cut social assistance allowances and the interest of the 
involved claimant. In the Netherlands, the Central Appeals Tribunal has decided that it is 
possible to derive a right to social assistance from article 8 ECHR. It can, however, be 
questioned whether sanctioned welfare recipients can effectively invoke article 8 ECHR, 
especially regarding the required balancing of interests.
35
 In sum, European law and 
international law do not seem to be much of a help to individual litigants who are cut off 
of social assistance benefits for a longer period.    
In the final part of this section we will consider to what extent municipal 
reintegration obligations are contrary to the ban on compulsory labor in ILO convention 
29 and European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). Article 4 (2) ECHR, provides 
that no one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour. Since article 4 
ECHR can be directly invoked in court, we will assess in particular if and how art 4 
ECHR provides extra safeguards with respect to social assistance rights.  
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There is not much ECtHR jurisprudence with respect to article 4 ECHR. One of 
the few cases, which is also relevant for this paper, concerns the Van der Mussele case. 
Van der Mussele was an attorney who in the context of his traineeship was obliged to 
take so-called pro-deo cases. Referring to ILO Convention 29, the ECtHR decided that 
Van der Mussele did not perform ‘compulsory labour’. The ECtHR held that the question 
if work should be labeled as ‘compulsory labour’ depends on a balance of interests. At 
any case the required labour must be reasonable in terms of the burdens put on the person 
in question and the purpose of the compulsory labour. In case an excessive burden is put 
on the person in question the labour must considered contrary article 4 ECHR (Eleveld, 
2012).   
The Dutch Central Appeals Tribunal has followed the ECtHR argumentation in 
the Van der Mussele case in a case where a welfare recipient refused to participate in a 
disciplinary project that regarded ‘closely supervised labor in greenhouses’. In its ruling, 
the Tribunal, first of all, stated that the offered project increases the employment 
possibilities of the person involved. Subsequently, the Tribunal tested the provision 
against article 4(2) ECHR and concluded that there is no question of a violation of the 
ban on compulsory labour. Only when, considering all circumstances of the case, it 
cannot (or no longer) be expected from a participant to perform the activities or work that 
he or she is instructed to do because of their excessive or disproportionately taxing nature 
and/or the total lack of perspective towards employment that they offer, one could call it 
a situation of compulsory labour. Thus, invoking article 4(2) ECHR, this ruling imposed 
some restrictions on municipal Work-First measures. These measures are only permitted 
on the condition that they are geared to the individual situation and are not excessive or 
disproportionately burdensome. Moreover, the measure should offer ‘some’ perspective 
of employment. Thus the Central Appeals Tribunal has provided a framework of criteria 
for judging the validity of obligations imposed on the beneficiaries. To put it differently, 
international law has offered some minimum standards for testing the legality of Work-






The data presented in section 3 and the allocation shift of welfare services from the state 
to employers and municipalities which we examined in section 4 seem to be in line with 
the trend that we discussed in the introduction, namely, a slow transformation from a 
system based on notions of equality and solidarity to a system that is increasingly 
influenced by the values of freedom of choice and individual responsibility. Major 
reforms in the 1980s and 1990s have resulted in several benefit cuts. Responsibilities 
have been shifted towards individual citizens and, in the case of sickness and disability, 
also to employers. The reforms have also resulted in lower unemployment benefits. As a 
result of these changes social assistance provisions have become more important as a 
safety net, whereas at the same time rights to social assistance have been eroded. 
The reforms of the Dutch welfare state were triggered by several factors. In 
addition to political and ideological motives for reforms, financial considerations play a 
significant role in welfare state reforms. Worsening economic situations increased the 
pressure on government budgets because of lower tax revenues and higher expenditures 
on unemployment benefits. On the other hand, demographic trends, such as the ageing of 
the population, led to higher welfare state expenditures with respect to health and old age. 
All in all, as section 2 and 3 have shown the Dutch welfare state is still a quite extensive 
welfare state, spending throughout 1980-2009 45 percent of its budget on social policies.    
The allocation shift in welfare state services indicated, above all, that the Dutch 
welfare state is increasingly aimed at activation. Notwithstanding that activation 
measures have had a positive effect on the reintegration of disabled employees and social 
assistance recipients, we also expressed some concerns as regards to the safeguarding of 
rights to an adequate income. It was argued that some of (the consequences of) the 
allocation shifts in welfare state services might be contrary to the Dutch Constitution and 
international law provisions. However, in most cases individual litigants cannot invoke 
these provisions before the court. In addition, international law does seem to allow 
privatization of the sickness and disability insurance as long as the State supervises this 
new allocation of welfare services which are based on the principle of solidarity. The 
European Committee of Social Rights has been critical in this respect. Supervisory bodies 
of international treaties have also expressed some critique on the introduction of Work-
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Fist policies in conjunction with sanctions, resulting from the decentralization of social 
assistance. In addition, a fairly recent judgment of the Central Appeals Tribunal has 
shown how international law can offer some minimum standards for testing the legality 
of Work-first projects. 
An issue which we have only slightly touched upon, concerns the changes in the 
welfare state provisions related to children and family. Whereas breadwinner provisions 
were abolished in the 1980s and 1990s due to European demands regarding equal 
treatment of men and women and the simultaneous increased female labour market 
participation, these provisions were hardly replaced by extra provisions for children and 
other dependents. Of course, the Work and Care act (section 2) provides various leave 
rights, however, without granting rights to payments during leaves. Section 3 showed that 
expenditures on family policies even decreased between 1980 en 2009.  
Further reforms of the Dutch welfare state can be expected in the near future. As 
in most European countries, the severe recession has created considerable fiscal pressure. 
In addition, the ageing of the population increases this pressure even further. Hence, the 
cabinet of liberals and social democrats that was installed in 2012 has announced major 
reforms of several welfare state programs. The proposals include for instance a 
shortening of the duration of the unemployment benefit scheme and a higher retirement 
age. Such reforms are not only supposed to reduce the government expenditures on 
welfare state arrangements, they should also increase the labor force participation rate in 
order to broaden the funding basis for the welfare state. There are no indications of new 
allocations of welfare state service in this respect. Yet, other reforms may also have 
repercussions for the public safeguards of welfare state rights. In any case, it seems likely 
that for an increasing part of people living in the Netherlands social assistance rights 
become the main source of income protection. From this perspective it is imperative that, 
in accordance with European and International law, individual rights to social assistance 
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